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JUDICIALIZING POLITICS,
POLITICIZING LAW
JOHN FEREJOHN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, there has been a profound shift in power away from
legislatures and toward courts and other legal institutions around the world.
This shift, which has been called “judicialization,”1 has become more or less
global in its reach, as evidenced by the fact that it is as marked in Europe, and
especially recently in Eastern Europe, as it is in the United States.  The specta-
cles of Italian judges undermining Italy’s postwar system of musical cabinets, or
of newly energized French judges hounding prime ministers and presidents, are
only the most visible aspects of these developments.  One could also point to
the role, and recent success, of judges in seeking to arrest and prosecute dicta-
tors and military leaders.  Additionally, our own United States Supreme Court’s
intervention into electoral politics in Bush v. Gore2 was yet another manifesta-
tion of this trend.
One can distinguish at least three ways in which courts have taken on new
and important roles relative to legislatures.  First, courts have been increasingly
able and willing to limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority by
imposing substantive limits on the power of legislative institutions.  Second,
courts have increasingly become places where substantive policy is made.
Third, judges have been increasingly willing to regulate the conduct of political
activity itself—whether practiced in or around legislatures, agencies, or the elec-
torate—by constructing and enforcing standards of acceptable behavior for in-
terest groups, political parties, and both elected and appointed officials.
But judicialization is not simply limited to the increasingly important, perva-
sive, and direct roles that courts play in making policy.  The fact that courts fre-
quently intervene in policy-making processes also means that other political ac-
tors, as well as groups seeking political action, have reason to take the
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FEREJOHN_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:39 PM
42 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3
possibility of judicial reaction into account.  Proposals need to be framed in a
way to ensure that legislation will neither be struck down nor interpreted in un-
dersirable ways.  In order to achieve such a result, part of the policy debate over
new legislation must aim at anticipating the response of legal institutions.  So,
we see a global application of one aspect of the phenomenon that de
Tocqueville noted about American politics years ago: the transformation of po-
litical questions into legal ones.3  This means that legal/constitutional considera-
tions and rhetoric assume new and sometimes decisive importance in ordinary
legislative policy-making.
One aspect of judicialization can be observed in the widespread adoption of
institutions and practices of constitutional adjudication, even in places with le-
gal institutions and traditions that had long been inhospitable to this process.
True, the modes of constitutional adjudication adopted in Europe and else-
where do not precisely follow the U.S. model.  Ordinary European judges are
not permitted to strike down legislation; that authority is confined to specialized
constitutional courts located outside the judicial system.  Nevertheless, many of
these new European constitutional courts have been at least as willing to invali-
date and modify parliamentary legislation as the U.S. Supreme Court has
been—even in its most activist periods.4  Moreover, the existence of constitu-
tional courts has, in effect, pressed ordinary judges to take account of constitu-
tional issues in their everyday judicial activities.  For example, European judges
regularly interpret legislative statutes and administrative ordinances in view of
the constitution and decide which issues need to be referred to the constitu-
tional court.5  Moreover, the rise of constitutional adjudication has transformed
the landscape of parliamentary politics by forcing legislators to take constitu-
tional considerations into account when crafting legislative schemes.6
Perhaps as important as the invention of constitutional courts is the creation
of supernational judicial institutions in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, namely the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.  These
institutions have increasingly limited the capacities of national political institu-
tions to make and implement domestic and international policy.  Indeed, the in-
corporation of human rights jurisprudence in European states has given ordi-
3. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Vintage Edition 1945, reprinted
1990) (“Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question.”).
4. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at 1 (“Constitutional judges routinely intervene in legislative pro-
cesses, establishing limits on law-making behavior, reconfiguring policy-making environments, even
drafting the precise terms of legislation.”).  See also Christine Landfried, Germany, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 309 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995) (discussing the
German constitutional court).
5. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Deliberative Institutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE,
EAST AND WEST (W. Sadurski ed., forthcoming 2002).
6. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at 194-204 (arguing that constitutional courts assume a “pedagogi-
cal function” with respect to legislatures, which are induced to take constitutional issues into account
when legislating).
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nary judges much more power to challenge legislation.7  Even British judges can
now review and challenge acts of Parliament, a circumstance that was incon-
ceivable just a few months ago.  In effect, there are now three judiciaries in
Europe that can review legislation: ordinary judges, constitutional justices, and
the justices serving on the European Courts.  In addition, the systems in places
such as Eastern Europe and Latin America are moving in this direction as well.
In the United States, we have a long history of courts’ determining constitu-
tional limits for legislatures.8  To be sure, those limits have fluctuated over time,
and their contents remain deeply in dispute—both normatively and descrip-
tively—among scholars, judges, and politicians.  Moreover, judges have long
engaged in substantive policy-making in this country as well.  But the third
strand of change—judicial regulation of the conduct of political life—has clearly
increased over the past few decades.  Courts have been playing an increasingly
active—even an aggressive—role in such affairs as election regulation, cam-
paign finance, organization of parties and interest groups, and maintenance of
the electoral system.  More recently, and more controversially, courts have even
begun to regulate internal congressional processes by enforcing what might be
called “deliberative requirements” on legislative action.9  This results not only
in more legislation being made in courts, but also in subjecting legislation that is
made in other institutions to process-based judicial regulation.
In view of these developments, it is no surprise that appointments to both
the U.S. Supreme Court and to other federal courts have become partisan po-
litical issues.  This has been true since the early days of the republic, although
the intensity and frankness of the conflict has fluctuated over time.  Particularly
when the courts have systematically attempted to block or overturn the action
of political majorities—as happened in the 1930s—there are often overt parti-
san fights over who should serve on the courts.  These struggles are often seen
as occasions in which principles of democracy—or at least some conception of
democracy—come into conflict with legal principles—or at least some concep-
tion of those principles.  Not surprisingly, such occasions put particular stress on
the constitutional links between the political and judicial branches of govern-
ment.
To some extent, the political aspect of court appointments is both inevitable
and legitimate in our governmental structure.  Democratic responsiveness and
legality are complex and sometimes conflicting ideals.  What each of them re-
7. Judges cannot invalidate laws or administrative actions, but they can declare them inconsistent
with the European Convention for Human Rights and urge the governments to bring their domestic
laws into conformity with the Convention.  Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effecting Supernational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 293-95 (1997).
8. To be precise, for most of our history, courts have primarily been active in acting as a check for
state and local governments, but over much of the last century, federal legislation has been subjected to
searching judicial scrutiny as well.  The one period of judicial grace, beginning in 1937, was fleeting; this
period truly reflected a shift in the content of the rights that courts would protect, from economic to
personal rights.  The defining statement of this shift is in the famous footnote four in U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
9. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001).
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quires at any point in time is an open and contested question.  Practices of judi-
cial rule-making are right at the contested boundary of these concepts.  Fur-
thermore, when the domain of courts includes the making of general rules that
affect everyone and not just actual litigants—as it does in constitutional
courts—we should expect popular and political reactions.  While courts are leg-
islating, all of us have a legitimate interest in who sits on them.  While court ap-
pointments are inevitably political, they are not always partisan.  When courts
become politicized in a partisan sense, matters become more troubling.  De-
mocracies produce shifting majorities, and if shifts in partisan control translate
into judgeships, then the content of law becomes unstable.
First, this article will argue that what is at stake, institutionally, is the alloca-
tion of legislative power—the power to establish general rules of prospective
application.10  In a republic, the legislative power is supposed to be exercised, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the people; and power for and by the people is the prin-
cipal source of direction and legitimacy in a democratic government.  For this
reason, the legislative power is always, initially, vested in a representative leg-
islature.  This legislature typically has the closest political connections to the
people themselves, a phenomenon that provides an attractive republican pre-
scription for governmental institutions.  Modern constitutions may divide the
legislature up in various ways: vertically—by creating a constitutional legislative
process, and perhaps by allocating some powers to the legislatures of the prov-
inces or states, and horizontally—by permitting the executive to participate in
the legislative process in various ways as a proposer of legislation, a veto player,
or both.11  Each of these entities—the national legislature, the constitutional
legislature, and the provincial legislatures—is a representative institution and,
according to standard republican theory, rightly exercises legislative powers.
Second, this article will argue that, although constitutions and public expec-
tations may associate the legislative power with the legislature, that power can
and will relocate itself among governmental institutions.  From a historical
standpoint, it has done so repeatedly.  Practically, legislative power shifts
around among all the branches of government.  So, we see the formal depend-
ence of the executive on the legislature in European systems has had the effect
of placing the most substantial legislative powers (the power to propose and to
structure the deliberative agenda) in the hands of the government itself.  While
this trend is less marked in the United States because of the separation of leg-
10. It is not important, for present purposes, to worry about whether courts make or find rules of
prospective action.  Indeed, on some legislative models, legislative rule-making is epistemic, or ought to
be.  Whatever courts are doing when establishing rules, they can be regarded as establishing rules that
are both prospective and general.  This is not to say that there are no differences between legislatures
and courts as rule-makers; there are powerful normative reasons why some decisions should be made in
one institution, with its attendant procedures, rather than another.  Moreover, different institutions will
perform differently, and so the allocation of legislative authority is consequential.
11. Obviously, the way in which the executive and the legislature are related differs greatly among
democracies, with European governments typically making the executive responsible to parliament.  In
contrast, the U.S. structure is premised on the notion that the two branches are co-equal (along with
the judicial branch).
FEREJOHN_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:39 PM
Page 41: Summer 2002]JUDICIALIZING POLITICS, POLITICIZING LAW 45
islative and executive authority, it is nevertheless apparent.  For example, the
President has assumed at least informal control over much of the regular legis-
lative agenda (especially when partisan control of government is undivided).
And, of course, the gravitation of a great deal of effective legislative authority
to courts and executive administrative agencies has become increasingly preva-
lent in recent years.
I argue that this is not only an empirical fact about political processes, but
also a matter guided in part by normative considerations.  There are good rea-
sons why some kinds of legislation should be debated and formulated in a leg-
islature, while others should be made in courtrooms or administrative agencies.
This is so because different types of substantive legislation seem to require dif-
ferent kinds of reasons or justifications.  The best argument for certain policies
might be more or less majoritarian: If the people (or their representatives)
choose to build a larger or smaller system of national parks, then that decision
is, properly, up to them.  Other kinds of policies might require appeals to eco-
nomic, technical, or moral principles.  Legislatures often delegate a great deal of
authority to insulated central banks and intelligence services, and they also en-
dow myriad other agencies with lawmaking authority in order to ensure that
policy is both responsive to technical reason and resistant to political incentives
to intervene.  And, even if the people would rather not permit some unpopular
minority to use public schools or access welfare services, courts require that
such legislative proposals respond to considerations of equality and due process.
Shifting legislation to courts and agencies, in these respects, has the effect of
changing the kinds of considerations—the kind of deliberative justifications—
that go into choosing among policies.
Third, this article argues that, when courts engage in lawmaking, that law-
making will be responsive to structural political factors.  These factors can be
modeled explicitly.  As a result, a positive theory of judicialization would pre-
dict that, under specific political circumstances, courts will be able to make
lasting policies.  The conditions for policy-active courts are unrelated to the
ideological aspirations of political officials. That is, policy-making courts might
develop more or less liberal or conservative policies, depending on external
structural conditions and the internal makeup of the judiciary.  Of course, if
positive theorists can explain when courts will assume a policy-making role and
what that role is likely to be, then political actors such as judges, bureaucrats,
and congressmen will be able to do so as well.
Fourth, I will argue as a corollary that the structural conditions favorable to
judicial legislation are also favorable to judicial regulation of the conduct of
candidates for office, elected officials, and their appointees.  The judicialization
of politics has partly the same explanation as the judicialization of lawmaking
itself.  In this sense, the theory is quite crude and may therefore fail to explain
the full extent of judicial regulation of political activity.  Perhaps judges play a
policing role over politicians even when the structural conditions for judicial
policy-making are not propitious.  Politicians may, for example, recognize that
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they have a stake in appealing to a more or less independent outside party to
enforce rules of fair play.  Perhaps this is because it is costly for politicians to try
to control corrupt but powerful political leaders.  Delegation of regulatory
powers to agencies and courts may solve a collective action problem.  If these
considerations have any bite, my explanation is only partial.12
Finally, this article argues that politics—suitably defined and qualified—
tends to follow legislation.  I think that this is not only an empirical fact but that
it tracks normative considerations as well.  Insofar as all of us have a stake in
the general rules that govern us, we have claims to influence the formulation
and adoption of those rules.  This does not mean, however, that the politics of
judicial policy-making is the same as legislative politics.  Nor does this imply
that there is anything wrong with judicial rule-making’s having political aspects.
Quite the opposite.  The power to make rules ought to be the subject of politi-
cal contestation and deliberation by those whom the rules affect.  The shape of
judicial politics, however, is and ought to be different in some ways than that
which surrounds the political branches.
II
LEGISLATIVE POWER
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution shared with Montesquieu the idea that
the legislative power could and should be separated from both the executive
and especially the judicial power (the power to resolve disputes by applying
pre-existing rules).13  Montesquieu thought, in particular, that combining legisla-
tive and judicial powers in the same hands was the very essence of tyranny—by
which he meant arbitrary rule.14  In such circumstances, the judge/legislator
could simply both shape the rule and decide the case simultaneously.  Decisions
would be completely unguided by principle and would instead be arbitrary and
unpredictable.
Montesquieu worried less about how to establish and maintain the appro-
priate separation institutionally.  He thought that judicial institutions as well the
judicial power itself were inherently weak (he called the judicial power a pou-
voir nulle, or a null power), and he implied that the real threat of consolidation
was to be expected from the holder of legislative power (in his day, presumably,
the monarchy).  But his exhortations were directed more to the evil than to the
remedy.  Beyond pointing to English institutions, which he thought had been
relatively successful in separating judging from legislating, he provided little
guidance as to how such a separation could be developed or sustained.
12. The weakness and dependency of the FEC may be contrary to the idea that these other sources
of explanation are particularly powerful.  Congress appears to have been careful to keep that agency
from developing a capacity to regulate political activity.
13. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS ch. 6, bk. 11 (David Wallace Carrithers ed.,
1977).
14. Id.
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While they rejected other Montesquieuian advice, the framers of the U.S.
Constitution  adopted this assumption.  This is evidenced by the fact that, while
the Constitution does establish some institutional restraints on the executive
and judicial powers, it is much more concerned about checking and balancing
congressional powers.  It must have seemed natural in the eighteenth century to
think of governmental powers as somehow naturally associated with specific in-
stitutional departments.  Who else would hold legislative power but the legisla-
ture itself?  So, for the most part, the framers vested the legislative power in
Congress, the executive power in the president, and the judicial power in the
Supreme Court.  And, since they were concerned that the legislative power was
the most voracious and dangerous of governmental powers, what would be
more natural than to surround Congress, its nominal holder, with the most sub-
stantial institutional checks?  As a result, the less dangerous executive and judi-
cial branches were to be monitored only by lesser external checks, at least in the
operation of their proper powers.15  Of course, the executive and judiciary were
made dependent on Congress for funds and delegated authority.16  Likewise,
appointments to the judiciary, jurisdiction, and enforcement of judicial orders
were controlled by other branches.17
Today, things do not seem so simple.  Lawmaking takes place in every gov-
ernmental department; only its institutional form differs from one branch to the
next.  We need not worry much about the fact that some norms take on the par-
ticular formal aspect of congressional statutes and are generated according to
specific constitutionally governed procedures, while others emanate from ad-
ministrative processes or from decided legal cases.  To the extent that any gov-
ernmental agency exercises lawmaking power in an unregulated manner, it can
be dangerous to liberty.
Twentieth-century legal theorists Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, in various
ways, came to recognize that the identification and control of legislation was a
much more complex and open-ended task than it must have seemed in the
eighteenth century.  Hart, for example, attempted to provide a way of identify-
ing valid legal rules.  To this end, he postulated that every legal system can be
characterized by a rule of recognition that picks out all valid legal norms.18  Such
a rule for any proposed norm would have to say whether it constituted a valid
legal norm or not—however it emerged and whatever form it took.  It would
have to, in that respect, recognize norm generation by any institution empow-
ered to do so.  Arguments still continue as to the content of Hart’s rule of rec-
ognition (or, indeed, if that idea is a workable conception of legality), but no-
one doubts the complexity that such a rule would have to take if it were to track
the normative structure of any modern legal system.  In particular, it would
have to recognize administrative and judicial rule-making as well as rule pro-
15. U.S. CONST. art II; art. III.
16. U.S. CONST. art I, §7, cl. 1; art. I, §9, cl. 7.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
18. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961).
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duction by legislatures.  Indeed, in the modern state the legislature generates
only a tiny minority of the norms by which we live.  The rule of recognition,
therefore, would mostly amount to an explanation and justification of adminis-
trative and judicial action.
From a more practical viewpoint, Kelsen was concerned about keeping leg-
islation under the regulation of superior norms, and to this end he invented the
device of an institutionally separated and specialized body to regulate ordinary
legislation.19  This new court was to be placed outside of the structure of existing
governmental institutions and was to be independent of the judiciary as well as
of the other branches.20  He recognized that this specialized court would itself
necessarily be exercising legislative powers of some kind.21  At first, he thought
that a constitutional court would be engaged only in negative legislation—for
example, striking down statutes or ordinances that were inconsistent with con-
stitutional norms—but eventually he was forced to admit that positive legisla-
tive powers were in play as well.22  After a statute is struck down, it remains to
the constitutional tribunal to reconstruct the legal landscape without it, a task
that entails the generation of positive norms.  More fundamentally, in order to
decide whether there is a conflict between a constitutional norm and a statute, a
constitutional court must interpret both the statute and the constitutional norm.
Such interpretations necessarily specify the extent and shape of the norms and
are themselves norm-generating.  In this respect, positive norm generation is at
the core of constitutional adjudication.
Kelsen’s idea for regulating lawmaking, while differing from the U.S. model
of judicial review, still places most of its weight on a supreme constitutional
body to enforce constitutional norms.  Insofar as legislation is produced
throughout government, reliance on judicial regulation is likely to be cumber-
some and practically inadequate to control the vast quantity of rules that have
been produced in the ordinary operation of government.  Indeed, modern gov-
ernments rely more heavily on what we might call “structural methods” for con-
trolling lawmaking.  These “structural methods” of regulating legislation can be
broken down into three models.
The first model is republican: The production of legislative statutes is con-
trolled principally by the fact that legislators are held accountable to their con-
stituents through elections.  Additionally, the participation of the executive is
typically required for legislative action and enforcement.23
19. Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation. A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the
American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183 (1942) (summarizing these ideas in English).
20. Id.
21. Kelsen developed this view in response to criticisms by Carl Schmitt in HANS KELSEN, WER
SOLL DER HUETER DER VERFASSUNG SEIN (WHO IS TO BE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION)
(1931).
22. Id.
23. This dependence on the executive branch is constitutionally explicit in presidential systems
such as in the United States, where the president has a limited veto.  In parliamentary systems, such as
that in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France, however, the executive typically monopolizes access
to the legislative process.
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The second model is of more recent vintage: Administrative rule-making is
controlled by the agency’s dependence on the legislature for funding and
authority, by the agency’s dependence on the executive for staffing and direc-
tion, and by procedural requirements on rule-making.  So, administrative legis-
lation is controlled indirectly by the fact that administrators are responsible to
elected officials.
The third model illustrates that the control of judicial legislation is largely
managed by limits on courts’ jurisdiction.24  U.S. federal courts, for example,
may only decide cases or controversies between actual parties who are in
genuine conflict with one another.25  Moreover, whatever general norms are
formulated in order to frame and settle a particular dispute are to have legal ef-
fect only on those future cases that are sufficiently similar to the original dis-
pute.  In addition, courts, like agencies, are dependent on the legislature for
funds and authority, and on the executive for enforcing judicial orders.
Judicial legislation is, therefore—at least in principle—limited in its reach.
These limits are reinforced by the limitations on what counts as precedent.
Moreover, courts sometimes adopt a policy of deferring to elected or appointed
officials or administrative departments.  An example is the Chevron doctrine,26
which commits courts to defer to agency interpretations of their own statutes so
long as those readings are textually plausible.27  But it is important to see that
the limitations on lawmaking with respect to judges are, unlike those on the
other departments, self-imposed.  These limitations arise from judicially devel-
oped and judicially enforced ideas of justiciability, precedent, and whatever
policies of deference to other governmental departments courts have decided to
follow.
III
THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING
Classical democratic theory associates politics with the activities of the leg-
islature, and law with the operation of the judicial branch.  Politics is natural to
the operation of the legislature and is both unavoidable and legitimate there.
Indeed, political contestation is understood as necessary to realize core demo-
cratic values.  The legislature makes laws that are binding on all; each individ-
ual, therefore, has a stake in deciding who should sit in the legislature.  All are
entitled to monitor legislative debates, to have timely input and influence on
their decisions, and to demand that its members stand before us to account for
what they have done in elections.  These political expectations entitle us to or-
24. In U.S. federal courts, these limits take the form of justiciability doctrines that are developed
by the courts to police themselves.  We argue here that these doctrines evolve under the shadow of pos-
sible congressional regulation.  See John Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 76 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
26. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27. Id. at 843.
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ganize parties and factions to elect, monitor, criticize, oppose, and otherwise in-
fluence lawmakers.  In this sense, lawmaking politics is expected to be conten-
tious, partisan, and ideological.  To be sure, the political space to criticize and
contest power can be abused in ways that threaten the operation of democracy
itself.  Madison insisted that the spirit of faction can be dangerous to liberty and
therefore, ultimately, to democracy.28  He also recognized, however, that in a
republic, factions and parties, which serve to further both public and private in-
terests, cannot be abolished without undermining republican government itself.
At best, the politics of faction and party can be regulated or managed to limit
the likely abuses.  The most satisfactory form of regulation relies on the elec-
toral process to correct political pathology.  Of course, if democratic self-
regulation fails, there are court-enforced constitutional safeguards that may be
employed to limit abusive lawmaking.
By contrast, law, or the application of law, is supposed to happen in court-
rooms.  The application of law may be controversial, but it is expected to be
mostly a technical matter of finding the right principles under which the dispute
can be settled.  The duty of judges and legal officers is to provide fair and un-
biased tribunals before which conflicting parties can settle their disputes under
pre-existing accepted legal norms.  This model sees courts as places where par-
ticular disputes are settled, not as places where general and prospective regula-
tions are formulated.  Citizens have no legitimate claim to influence courts as
they do the legislature, or at least not in the same ways that they seek to influ-
ence the legislature.  They can enact statutes indirectly by lobbying legislatures,
and they can try to assure that competent and sympathetic judges are appointed
to the bench by lobbying those officials responsible for political appointments.
Perhaps citizens can even demand that judges stand for election from time to
time.  But citizens have no claim to overturn judicial rulings or to press judges
to decide ongoing cases in one way or another.  And, even where judges are
subject to elections, there is more than a little squeamishness about the idea
that they should have to run electoral campaigns, or make promises as to how
they will decide future cases.29  The two activities—legislative and judicial—are
to be conducted separately, according to different principles.  In courtrooms,
there is no place for partisan activities, no room for pressuring or influencing
judges to make particular decisions, and only a little room to eject poorly per-
forming judges from the bench.
Nowadays the notion that politics can or ought to be confined to the legisla-
tive process is recognized as too simplistic.  No one doubts that administrative,
or delegated, lawmaking can have consequences that reach as widely as ordi-
nary congressional acts.30  The role of administrative agencies in creating af-
28. THE FEDERALIST 10, 51 (Madison).
29. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
30. See, e.g., CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY (2d ed. 1999).  (From the 1970s on, “to a remarkable extent the health, safety, fi-
nancial well-being, and general quality of life of Americans would hinge on the success of rulemaking
FEREJOHN_FMT.DOC 08/01/02  1:39 PM
Page 41: Summer 2002]JUDICIALIZING POLITICS, POLITICIZING LAW 51
firmative action policies, vehicle emissions rules, requirements for the disposal
of hazardous wastes, prescription drug regulation, the identification of endan-
gered species, and the development of regulations on logging on federal lands
all illustrate the wide extent of delegated lawmaking.  Rule-making in each of
these areas involves substantial redistributions of wealth and picking winners
and losers.  As a consequence, each situation  is inherently controversial and of-
ten hard-fought.  Not surprisingly, those persons who are to be subject to the
rules are often willing to spend substantial resources, directly and indirectly, to
influence the form regulations are to take.31  Sometimes interest groups work to
shape the proposed rule within the rule-making process.  Sometimes groups
work to influence who is appointed to policy-making positions within the
agency.  And of course, sometimes, interest groups work to elect congressional
and presidential candidates, who will in turn appoint sympathetic people to the
administrative posts.32  In the case of administrative agencies, citizens expect
that interest groups subject to agency rules will try to influence, one way or an-
other, what those rules are.  And sometimes this will lead these groups to en-
gage in partisan activity—favoring one party’s candidate over another—and
sometimes it will lead them to seek access to officials affiliated with both of the
major parties.  In this sense, administrative lawmaking is inevitably and justifia-
bly politicized.
If anything, the consequences of judicial rule-making are often more pro-
found than agency policy-making.  The familiar cases to which we can point in-
clude the countermajoritarian confrontations such as the 1937 standoff between
the Supreme Court and the New Deal congresses.33  The New Deal congresses
asserted legislative authority over the economy that contravened various judi-
cial doctrines and, in the end, the Supreme Court was induced to reshape those
doctrines.34  Negative instances, where courts successfully block ordinary legisla-
tion on the ground that it infringes some fundamental right, are most familiar to
students of constitutional law in cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey.35
There, the court refused to permit certain legislative restrictions on access to
abortions.36
Judicial legislation is not always, or even primarily, “negative” in the sense
of preventing legislative majorities from acting as it decides best.  Judges also
make law in a more positive sense—acting where the legislature has refrained
from doing so.  The famous instances include the extension of constitutional
by agencies.  These rules would also impose unprecedented costs, transfer huge amounts of wealth
across our society and affect our capacity to vie in increasingly competitive world markets.”)
31. JAMES WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980).
32. JAMES WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT (2000).
33. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 NYU L. REV. 1383, 1396 (2001).
34. Id.
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Id.
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protections to those accused of crimes,37 the development of rights to abortion,38
the development of policies to integrate the schools39 or establishing busing
plans in various school districts,40 the development of rules governing prayer in
the schools,41 and many others.  Nothing in any of these policy areas made them
uniquely fitted for judicial rather than legislative determination.  Courts acted
partly because legislatures could not act, or if they did, acted inappropriately.
In each of these cases, courts developed policies that had far-reaching and
quite direct political ramifications.  Politicians sometimes responded by organ-
izing campaigns to impeach sitting justices, and some have tried to develop new
legislation aimed at testing and narrowing the reach of judicial doctrines, as in
Casey, where the Pennsylvania legislature tried to erode the protections granted
in Roe.42  Most frequently, the political response has been to try to influence the
composition of the courts in the appointment process.  Sometimes these at-
tempts involve mobilizing public opinion, organizing demonstrations, and en-
couraging resistance.  Most often, however, court-made policies have become
thematic material for electoral campaigns.43 Democrats have been vilified for
appointing justices favorable to protecting the criminally accused, or rights to
abortion or family planning services.44  Since Nixon’s adoption of the “Southern
Strategy” in 1968, Republicans have sometimes campaigned against the Su-
preme Court almost as much as against Democrats.45  Indeed, one could argue
that reactions to court-developed policies in civil rights and criminal procedure
have done as much to shape the development of American electoral and con-
gressional politics since 1968 as have any congressional decisions.
These examples illustrate that politics, often contentious partisan politics, is
inevitably associated with the exercise of legislative power, and that courts are
not immune to these pressures.  Whenever general and prospective rules are
made, there can be disagreement as to what the content of such rules ought to
be, and the resolution of this disagreement cannot be confined to settling the
dispute between the litigating parties.  The contest among these competing
ideas is intrinsically political in the sense that the choice of one rule or interpre-
tation over another must be justifiable in some sense to those whom the rule af-
fects.  Judicial argument is never expressed in partisan terms, but arguments
over which rules should be adopted are nonetheless political.  These arguments
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
41. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
42. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Roe, 410
U.S. 113.
43. THOMAS EDSALL AND MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 19, 114 (1991) (describing the Wil-
lie Horton ads, which blamed crime on permissive judges).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969) (an early and
prescient articulation of this strategy).
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concern the way that legal texts and previous decisions are to be understood, or
about what the constitution, or some conception of justice, requires.  However
they are phrased, these disputes are about within what rules citizens should live,
and everyone has a stake in seeing how they are decided.
The people have a rightful stake in lawmaking, wherever it occurs.  That
stake is most obvious for legislatures and is often articulated in theories of ad-
ministrative law as well.  One reason that such agencies can legitimately make
law is that there is a chain of accountability extending to elected officials such as
the President and members of the Senate.  Insofar as that chain is regarded as
too long or too indirect, agency accountability may be enhanced by requiring
that rule-making conform to additional procedural requirements, ensuring no-
tice, and providing open access to anyone with interests in the proposed rules.
Of course, these quasi-democratic justifications are not the only justifications
for agency lawmaking.  Taking advantage of technical expertise, getting good
information, and perhaps incorporating professional norms in formulating poli-
cies might provide stronger defenses in many cases.
In the case of judicial rule-making, popular justification, however indirect, is
harder to come by.  Some legal scholars emphasize that courts have a popular
pedigree, and appointments to high courts sometimes conform to representa-
tional norms.46  However, while citizens may be comfortable with politicians ap-
pointing judges, they are not usually willing to make judges accountable to
elected officials for their actions on the bench—not unless those actions are im-
peachable. Even where there are judicial elections, these events tend to be low-
information affairs favorable to returning the incumbent, and are seldom or-
ganized according in a partisan manner that might encourage the electorate to
play a real role in choosing judges.47  Indeed, as the early opponents of the Con-
stitution recognized, the insulation of courts from political processes poses spe-
cial problems of control, especially insofar as courts are producing legislation.48
Moreover, a better account of the legislative role of courts in a democratic
society would emphasize that the legimacy of judicial lawmaking is based on its
deliberative character.  On this view, the characteristic feature of the judicial
legislative process arises from the weakness of its democratic credentials.49
Courts, unlike legislatures, are expected to engage in a deliberative process to
46. CHRIS EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT (2001).
47. There is a substantial amount of literature in political science that argues that voters are able to
make intelligent choices in low-information elections, at least where such elections are competitive.
See the essays in ELEMENTS OF REASON (Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins and Samuel Popkin eds.,
2000), in particular the concluding essay, Arthur Lupia et al., Constructing a Theory of Reasoning, id. at
287.
48. This was one of the themes of the Anti-Federalist attack on the Constitution.  See SAUL
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN
AMERICA, 1788-1828, 90-91 (1999).  Writings of Anti-Federalists such as Federal Farmer, Brutus, El-
bridge Gerry, George Mason, and others reflecting this theme have been collected in a seven-volume
work, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
49. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Deliberative Institutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE,
EAST AND WEST (W. Sadurski ed., forthcoming 2002).
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find or shape general rules. Specifically, at least at the appellate level where
such rule-making occurs most explicitly, courts are to offer reasoned justifica-
tions both for their decisions and for doctrinal changes.  Insofar as courts are
expected to give reasons, they are accountable for their decisions. They are not,
of course, accountable in the same way that elected officials are.  A poorly rea-
soned decision will not get a judge removed from the bench.  But the finality of
that decision—whether it will be appealed and overturned—and the reach of
the decision through whatever rules that decision was intended to establish,
may be limited by other judges, lawyers, or by elected officials.  Poorly justified
decisions tend not to have extensive impact.
By way of contrast, citizens do not expect very much in the way of reason-
giving from legislatures, at least not as a condition for regarding statutes as
binding.  If a congressman can put together a large enough political coalition to
enact a statute—whether by convincing other members or by trading votes—
that statute has a claim on our obedience and respect.  Additional reasons are
not required.  Those of us who do not like the policy can electioneer and
campaign replace the congress, or terrify it, and get the statute changed.  In this
sense, members of the legislature are personally accountable for their actions.
While the model of a popularly accountable legislature has a certain austere
elegance, it does not take account of the complexity of making good rules.
Lawmaking is inherently fraught with uncertainties in that no one can know
what the consequences of a newly adopted rule will be.  It is hoped, of course,
that the legislature will adopt internal institutions and practices that manage
this uncertainty intelligently.  Indeed, in the United States, Congress has
adopted a complex committee system with extensive professional staff, and
members of Congress have often become substantive policy specialists.50  Con-
gressmen have learned as well to draw upon the expertise of broad networks of
specialists both in government and in the private sector to help in the lawmak-
ing enterprise.51  In other countries, the government, which is a particularly
powerful committee of the legislature, marshals the resources of the executive
departments to manage legislative uncertainty.52  But no matter how or how well
it is managed, one can never fully anticipate the effects of prospective rules.
The delegation of authority to specialized administrative agencies is a partial
response to this lawmaking uncertainty.  Rather than trying to anticipate all the
complexity to which a general rule would need to respond, Congress authorizes
administrators to develop more detailed rules, and it encourages them to gather
additional evidence and employ specialized expertise.53  Presumably, the growth
50. RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973).
51. STEVEN S. SMITH, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 109-11 (1995) (describing expanded resources
available to members of Congress).
52. MICHAEL LAVER & KENNETH SHEPSLE, MAKING AND BREAKING GOVERNMENTS:
CABINETS AND LEGISLATURES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 3 (1996).
53. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN
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and permanence of the administrative state testifies to its effectiveness in de-
veloping finer-grained rules than Congress could manage by itself.  Still, ad-
ministrative rule-making tends to be a fairly rigid and costly enterprise; rules
are adopted in these agencies, as in Congress, largely through anticipating how
these rules will alter behavior in the future.54  True, agencies sometimes can re-
spond to individual cases and tailor the application of rules in some ways.
Without a norm of stare decisis, however, case-by-case decision-making is inef-
fective in altering the rules themselves.
In view of the intractable uncertainty of prospective lawmaking in agencies
as well as Congress, courts possess some unique advantages.  Courts consider
rules in light of specific particular circumstances and are well-positioned to see
the injustices and inconveniences they impose on various litigants.  While the
rules courts develop are prospective, standing as precedents for similar cases in
the future, the resolution of the case before them is not.  Moreover, the practice
of stare decisis permits the gradual development of general rules through the ac-
tivities of many courts and judges and cases.55  As common lawyers have argued
for centuries, this kind of experience can help to shape rules that are well-suited
to actual circumstances of interaction.
IV
EXPLAINING JUDICIALIZATION
I shall explore two general causes of judicialization.  The first is an increas-
ing fragmentation of power within the political branches which limits their ca-
pacity to legislate, or to be the place where policy is effectively formulated.56  I
shall call this the fragmentation hypothesis.  When the political branches cannot
act, people seeking resolution to conflicts will tend to gravitate to institutions
from which they can get solutions; courts (and associated legal processes) often
offer such venues.  At least in the United States, with its system of checked leg-
islative powers, a divided legislature cannot easily stop courts from making
policy—even quite unpopular policies.
The second cause is more nebulous but perhaps more important.  It is the
sense that courts (at least certain courts) can be trusted to protect a wide range
of important values against potential political abuse.  Let us call this the rights
hypothesis.  The idea is that, as courts began to protect personal rights and lib-
erties in addition to property rights, opposition to an expansive judicial role di-
minished.  In the United States this shift from protecting economic to personal
liberties and civil rights was announced by the Supreme Court in Carolene
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).
54. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 53.
55. John Paul Stevens, “The Life Span of a Judge Made Rule,” in THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION
(Norman Dorsen ed., 1987).
56. See Jenna Bednar et al., A Political Theory of Federalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND
DEMOCRATIC RULE 223-67 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001).
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Products.57  In postwar Europe, the shift awaited the development of new
courts—constitutional tribunals—which were charged explicitly with the protec-
tion of a wide range of human rights.58  In both cases, the encouragement of a
jurisprudence that offered protection for a wide range of human rights and val-
ues, and the growth of courts capable of breathing life into these values, was
partly due to the people and to their legislatures.
These two hypotheses can be evaluated with either domestic or comparative
information.  Take, for example, the hypothesis that judicialization is explained
by the increased capacity or willingness of courts to protect wider collections of
rights.  A puzzling aspect of the sudden postwar rise of constitutional courts in
Europe is the collapse of historically powerful left and left-of-center opposition
to judicial review.  Judicial review was seen by these parties as antimajoritarian
and, based on the American example, European left parties saw it as a thinly
veiled attempt to entrench property rights.59  After World War II, this opposi-
tion was again voiced in both France and Italy from the left but, at least in Italy,
that opposition failed to prevent the establishment of a constitutional court.60
The impact of this failure is perhaps sharpened when it is recalled that the left,
especially the Communist Party, was at its peak of popularity in the immediate
post-war period.  If leftist parties had been able to block constitutional courts
before the war, why could they not continue to do so in a circumstance where
virtually all other political forces had been compromised or discredited?
In another article, Pasquale Pasquino and I have argued that the expansion
of the set of rights to be protected by the proposed constitutional courts played
an important role in the rapid and widespread acceptance of constitutional ad-
judication in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.61  The need to ensure that ordinary
lawmaking would be regulated by fundamental values was especially urgently
felt in Italy and Germany: The ordinary lawmaking processes in those countries
had completely failed to respect human rights during the fascist and nazi peri-
ods.  Not only was the legislature suspect as a defender of fundamental rights,
so too were the ordinary courts, which had done little to control or limit the im-
pact of authoritarian legislation.62  The institution of new constitutional courts,
which would have the power to overturn legislation but be independent from
57. 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
58. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 49.
59. The leader of the Italian Communist party articulated this objection during the debate over the
creation of a constitutional court in the Constituent Assembly in 1947: “All of this is inspired by fear:
the fear that tomorrow there might be a majority that is the free and direct expression of those working
classes that want to remake profoundly the political, economic, and social structure of the country; and
against this eventuality they want to have guarantees and to place impediments: from this we get the
heaviness and slowness of the legislative procedure . . . from this we get that bizarre creature the Con-
stitutional Court.” Michael Mandel, Legal Politics Italian Style, in Tate & Vallinder, supra note 4, at
265.
60. Id. at 265-70.
61. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 49.
62. Michael Mandel argues that “The initial activity of the [Italian] court . . . was the dismantling of
the fascist legal order . . . .”  Legal Politics Italian Style, in Tate & Vallinder, supra note 4, at 267.  The
same thing could be said about the initial task of the German constitutional court.
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the judiciary itself, were part of a response to this double circumstance of dis-
trust—of the legislature and of the ordinary court system.63  But how could op-
ponents of judicial review be persuaded that a specialized constitutional court
could be relied upon to protect a wide range of human rights and not only rights
of property?  Our suggestion is that, by making appointments to it in a manner
that permitted both left and right parties a role in appointments, and by insu-
lating the new courts from the ordinary judiciary, the proposed constitutional
courts became more credible as enforcers of human rights.64
The rights hypothesis can be evaluated with U.S. materials as well.  The
standard story about the pre-New Deal court was that it tended to enforce a
version of the Constitution that was heavily tilted toward protecting property-
related interests.65  Given the record of the Supreme Court in this period, it is
not surprising that there was significant opposition from liberals to the institu-
tion and practice of judicial review.66  But, however one interprets the events of
1935 to 1937, by 1940 the Court had begun to protect a very different mix of
rights; indeed, it entertained and enforced a different theory of the Constitution
altogether.67  Part of the reason for this was a dramatic change in the member-
ship of the Court.  Roosevelt’s new appointees had both personal and political
commitments to defining and protecting other, non-property-related interests.68
Faced with this new and very different Supreme Court, it is not surprising that
systematic left opposition to judicial review began to erode and that, indeed,
political liberals have come to form the principal support for the Court’s new
jurisprudence.69
The fragmentation hypothesis can also be tested either locally, with infor-
mation on U.S. political history, or in a broader, comparative setting.  Here, the
idea is that courts can exercise independent authority to shape policy only when
political institutions are too fragmented to check them.70  Political fragmentation
is a complex idea that can arise in many different ways.  Federalism, for exam-
ple, fragments certain kinds of political powers—vertically, between central and
local governments—and can create the space for judicial action. Federal sys-
63. Ferejohn and Pasquino, supra note 49.
64. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at 47 tbl.2.2 (describing modes of appointment of justices in vari-
ous constitutional courts).
65. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 1389-1402 (providing a careful history of standard and revi-
sionist accounts of Lochner).
66. Indeed, it is not surprising that European observers of American judicial review concluded that
such review would only protect property rights.  See supra note 59.
67. This shift was signaled by Justice Harlan Stone’s famous “footnote four.”  U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that discrimination against “discrete and insular
minorities” might warrant heightened judicial scrutiny).
68. ALPHEUS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 157-60 (1979).
69. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316-31 (1983) (defending Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
70. Bednar et al., supra note 56, at 262 (“[I]t is important to see that the restraints on the federal
government work only so long as no cohesive and long-lived majority is formed.  If such a majority
were to appear and was determined to undermine state authority, the structural protections could
probably not resist it for very long.”).
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tems not only provide opportunities and duties for states to make policy un-
checked by the national government, they also generally provide the states with
the capacity to block or slow actions by the national government.  Finally, juris-
dictional disputes in federal systems, whether between states or between a state
and the national government, need to be resolved, and courts are typically em-
ployed for this purpose.
Federalism is, of course, only one way that formal institutions can instanti-
ate fragmentation.  Another is by dividing powers horizontally, by adopting a
presidential form of government.  In presidential systems, the executive is not
accountable to the legislature but responds to the electorate more or less di-
rectly.  The executive is a coordinate branch of government with the same con-
stitutional status as the legislative and judicial departments.  Presidential sys-
tems usually provide means by which the different branches may check the
others in the exercise of their proper functions.  Presidents typically have some
kind of veto authority, legislatures usually control budgetary authority, and
courts need executive and sometimes legislative action to enforce their orders.
Checks of this kind tend to produce circumstances of stalemate and crisis.71  In-
stitutionally, then, power tends to be more fragmented in presidential than in
parliamentary systems.
Institutional fragmentation can be overcome if the political parties are suffi-
ciently well-organized and self-disciplined.  Well-organized parties can coordi-
nate actions across institutions, at least in some circumstances.  The clearest ex-
amples of this are not very attractive.  Until recently, the two examples were
found in one-party systems with “Leninist” parties such as those found in the
former Soviet Union or in Mexico.  There are less extreme circumstances in
which relatively well-organized parties can overcome institutional entropy.
Western European political parties are usually quite disciplined as well, but
they do not typically obtain parliamentary majorities.  The best known excep-
tion, however, is the British Westminster model, in which one party usually at-
tains a majority of seats in the House of Commons and maintains tight disci-
pline in parliamentary votes.  Such discipline makes the executive responsible
to the House of Commons; if the government loses its majority support in the
lower chamber, it is required to resign.  The fact that one party nearly always
has a majority and can discipline its members permits the British to maintain a
system of governmental responsibility.  In effect, legislative power is never
fragmented in Britain.72
71. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 645-48 (2000) (de-
scribing the tendency of presidential systems to come to an impasse, and citing the work of Juan Linz
documenting impasse tendencies of South American democracies that have used the presidential
model).
72. This is, of course, an overstatement.  During the 1970’s, the Labour party was so unable to
maintain internal party discipline that it actually refused to act according to the constitutional norm re-
quiring the government to resign if it could not enact critical legislation.  SAMUEL H. BEER, MODERN
BRITISH POLITICS: A STUDY OF PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1982).
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Fragmentation can also be achieved in less institutional ways.  For example,
divided government systems feature separate parties or coalitions that control
different branches.  In presidential systems, a typical form of divided govern-
ment has one party controlling the legislature and the other controlling the
presidency.  By contrast, in parliamentary systems, divided government occurs
when control over the two legislative chambers is split.  By making coordinated
legislative responses difficult, either form of government provides room for
courts to make policy unchecked.  Observers of divided government often de-
scribe it as something that just happens—like the weather—and not something
that the electorate brings about intentionally.  Recent scholarship in this area
suggests that a substantial, and pivotal, fraction of the electorate may be advan-
taged by dividing governmental powers and that they may even intentionally
split their ballots in order to bring about such a system.73
The U.S. system, on the other hand, is more complex.  One reason is that, in
the United States, parties usually cannot manage to discipline themselves very
effectively.  This is partly due to an electoral system that makes each member of
Congress a kind of ambassador from his or her district or state, and partly due
to the fact that the President is separately elected.  Representatives in such a
system are given every motivation to respond to the diverse needs of their con-
stituencies rather than to band together behind a coherent party program.  Cir-
cumstances in which a majority party is able to coordinate and discipline its
legislative activities tend to be quite brief.  Roosevelt’s first or second hundred
days, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Eighty-Ninth Congress, and perhaps Newt
Gingrich’s Contract with America in the first term of the 104th Congress pro-
vide examples.  In each of these cases, a majority party was sufficiently unified
with respect to specific achievements that the endemic parochialism of U.S.
electoral and constitutional institutions was temporarily subdued.74  This paro-
chialism, of course, can be overcome sometimes in periods of war, emergency,
and economic crisis.  The real lesson of these examples, however, is how rare
and brief the periods of unified parties actually are.
The fragmentation hypothesis implies that courts have more freedom of ac-
tion when the political branches are too fragmented to make decisions effec-
tively.  In such cases, policy making tends to gravitate to institutions that can re-
solve disputes effectively.  This claim needs to be qualified a bit from the start.
I am assuming that courts will tend to exercise their authority within political
constraints.  That is, they will not adopt courses of action that lead to regular
and repeated reversals or other sharp reactions by the political branches; doing
so would generally lead to inferior outcomes from the perspective of the judges
and would also diminish any routine deference that they may enjoy from the
other branches.  If this hypothesis holds, then we would expect increases in
73. E.g. MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 60-85 (1992).
74. See Bednar et al., supra note 56, at 256-62 (discussing importance of fragmentation as crucial to
judicial role, and describing the Civil War and Reconstruction, Roosevelt’s first term, and the Johnson
Great Society as brief instances in which political consensus replaced fragmentation).
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fragmentation to lead to wider areas of policy in which courts can determine
outcomes, without risking overrides from political officials.  Obviously, if courts
attempt to fix policy outside these bounds, political institutions would be capa-
ble of intervening.
Now we can consider some other comparative cases.  The most striking, no
doubt, is the development of European legal institutions since the Treaties of
Rome and Paris.75  European political institutions have been a textbook instance
of fragmentation.  They combine a federal structure with extremely indecisive
political institutions that are required to make decisions by employing either
unanimity rule or qualified majority rule.76  Moreover, there is no European-
wide party system—the parties are organized at the national level and are in-
ternally heterogeneous in the same way as U.S. parties.  This institutional struc-
ture—which is sometimes said to create a “democratic deficit”—resembles
nothing so much as the Articles of Confederation.
In this context, the European bureaucratic and judicial institutions have
flourished.  The European Commission has been accorded a very wide latitude
for formulating policy initiatives and establishing binding regulations with little
fear of checks from either the national governments or the European Parlia-
ment.  The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has been just as effective in es-
tablishing jurisdiction over national laws or ordinances that affect the move-
ment of goods, finance, or people throughout the European Union (“EU”).
Not surprisingly from this perspective, much of the development of the Euro-
pean Common market, and indeed of European social and economic integra-
tion, has been guided by the Commission and the Court of Justice rather than
by the Parliament or the national governments.77  This is, however, not to deny
that European bureaucrats have wide freedom to maneuver as well.
The fragmentation of European institutions may have diminished somewhat
in recent years—especially since the ratification of the Single European Act in
1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.78  These new agreements introduced
and expanded the use of qualified majority rule.  Moreover, the European Par-
liament has been able to assume a marginally more significant role in proposing
legislation and in budgetary decision-making.  Over the same period, however,
the introduction of new member states on the European fringe has increased
the internal heterogeneity of the EU, and this would tend to increase fragmen-
tation.  So, at the present time, it is unclear whether the decision-making lati-
tude of the ECJ is increasing or decreasing.  What is clear is that, when com-
pared with the circumstance of any of the national judicial institutions, the ECJ
has an extremely wide area for judicial discretion.
75. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at ch 6.
76. Id.
77. ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER
FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT (1998).
78. Jenna Bednar et al., Politics of European Federalism, in 16 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS (1996).
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V
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF POLITICS
The direct regulation of political activity is an especially important and in-
creasingly common form of judicialization.  When elected officials see that
bench appointees may become their regulators, prosecutors, and jailors, the
stakes of judicial appointment ratchet to a higher level.  Courts historically have
been heavily involved in regulating political activities, often employing racket-
eering and mail fraud statutes to draw and police the boundaries between ac-
ceptable and corrupt political practices.  Over the course of the last half-
century, judges and prosecutors have outlawed venerable political practices that
had arguably been at the foundation of political parties since the early years of
the republic.79  These efforts have often been controversial and certainly have
not always impacted political parties or public officials evenly.80  Outlawed prac-
tices have forced some high-ranking incumbent office-holders from office and
into prison.81  At times, judicial regulation has advantaged one or the other ma-
jor party or screened the established parties from competition.  In any case, it is
certain that judicial scrutiny of political parties and politicians has played a sig-
nificant role (along with other statutory reforms) in altering the ways that they
develop and seek votes.
Recent legal regulation of democratic practices has focused on developing
constitutional doctrines that permit courts to reshape political practices.  Ap-
portionment, access to the ballot box, campaign finance, and other modes of
regulating political life, long shielded from judicial scrutiny by the political
question doctrine, came under increasing pressure in the post-World War II pe-
riod.82  The post-Civil War amendments have played an especially important
role in these developments by permitting more congressional and judicial regu-
lation of state political practices.  However, while Congress has sometimes used
its enhanced authority under these Amendments to put in place legislation
aimed at opening up the political process to previously excluded groups, much
of the important action has taken place in agencies and courts.  As in the case
with the fraud statutes, court-imposed constitutional restrictions on political
practices have had an uneven impact on democratic processes.  Sometimes
courts have disadvantaged entrenched political parties by denying them control
79. See, e.g., Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(outlawing the hiring of governmental employees on the basis of political affiliation, sponsorship, and
support).
80. Note that the Nassau County Republican machine was the target of federal prosecutors in
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
81. U.S. v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (former Illinois Congressman convicted of
misappropriation of government funds).
82. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (claim that apportionment statute violated equal
protection upheld as judicable and within scope of Fourteenth Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (campaign finance law scrutinized and codified).
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over nominations or altering the franchise and redrawing district boundaries.83
Other times, judicial regulation has worked to protect incumbents or has estab-
lished parties at the expense of newcomers.84
Of course, newly robust constitutional restrictions have not always worked
to pry open the political process to include previously excluded minorities.  The
development of increasingly robust First Amendment rights of speech and asso-
ciation in the last quarter century has limited the capacity of the people or their
representatives to regulate campaign finance or to reform parties or the party
system.85  This line of constitutional development has led the court to a series of
rulings broadly favorable to incumbent parties and officials.
The most striking recent development, however, is the increasing willingness
of the Court to impose what might be called “deliberative requirements” on
legislatures.  This tendency is most pronounced in the recent series of federal-
ism decisions.86  In each of these cases, the court demanded that Congress pro-
vide a reasoned justification for its authority to enact certain statutes.87  Fur-
thermore, the Court appears to have set an increasingly high bar for what will
count as an adequate justification for the exercise of Commerce Clause or Sec-
tion 5 authority.  As others have noted, the Court seems to be treating the leg-
islature in this respect as it would an agency or even an inferior court.88
Naturally, we have no idea how far this practice will extend, but from the
standpoint of this article, its potential reach is of special significance.  Even if
the court leaves undisturbed an exercise of legislative authority, the demand
that such authority be connected to adequate reasons would have the effect of
forcing the legislature to act like a court when enacting statutes.  Maybe this is a
good idea, especially in statutes imposing particular burdens on protected liber-
ties.  But to demand that a majority act reasonably in all cases is to deny it a ca-
pacity to govern and to be democratically responsible before the people for
governing.  In this respect, the imposition of deliberation requirements poses
separation of powers issues.
While this observation is not original (and may turn out to be exaggerated),
it is connected to the larger claim of this paper.  The Court’s willingness to im-
pose increasing constitutional restrictions on legislatures can be explained in
terms of its increasing political independence of the other branches.  The court
83. Note the role of courts in dismantling Democratic control of southern politics by giving effect
to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act and subsequent amendments.  See generally Samuel Issacha-
roff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205.
84. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
85. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (state law mandating closed primary held invalid); Demo-
cratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (state law mandating open primary
held invalid); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (certain provisions of the federal law regulating cam-
paign contributions and spending held invalid).
86. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
87. Colker & Brudney, supra note 9, at 83.
88. Id.
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can make rules in this area under the same circumstances in which it can make
rules generally, but in this area uniquely, the court is not merely making rules, it
is forcing the legislature to alter internal procedures and processes; it is forced
to make legislative decisions more like judicial ones.  Moreover, as argued
above, the particular legal theories upon which courts base their judgments re-
garding whether the Congress has made a good case for its authority are, prop-
erly, ideological.  Courts making rules are engaged in political choice in which
the people have legitimate interests.  Therefore, we should not be surprised that
these interests will play out in deciding new appointments.
VI
EXPLAINING POLITICIZATION
Theoretically, Article I of the Constitution places the legislative power in
Congress or, more accurately, jointly in Congress and in the Presidency, acting
in accordance with the formalities of bicamerality and presentment.89  When this
body—which we shall call the constitutional legislature—is capable of action, it
will retain control of legislative authority.  Under these political circumstances,
though other entities—administrative agencies or courts in particular—may en-
gage in lawmaking (in the sense of promulgating binding normative rules of
general and prospective application), such activity takes place in the shadow of,
and at the sufferance of, the constitutional legislature.  Whatever rules are de-
veloped will tend to be ones that the constitutional legislature would accept.
These are circumstances in which the legislature is practically sovereign.90
Courts and agencies are capable of independent or autonomous action
where the constitutional legislature is too fragmented to react.91  In such circum-
stances, lawmaking will tend to migrate to those bodies that are capable of deci-
sive action.  In these conditions we see the development of such familiar entities
as the “runaway” bureaucracy and the activist courts.  The migration of legisla-
tive powers to agencies and courts places extraordinary burdens on these insti-
tutions.  When courts can make politically consequential and more-or-less final
decisions, anyone with an interest in those decisions has reason to try to frame
those interests in the form of persuasive legal arguments. And those interested
in judicial decisions have reason to seek to influence and, if possible, to control
appointments to the courts and other legal institutions.  In this sense, “judiciali-
89. U.S. CONST. art I., § 1; art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
90. We distinguish practical legislative sovereignty from the formal notion of parliamentary sover-
eignty that characterizes other legal systems.  In France, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty im-
plies that the parliament can do no wrong and so promulgated laws cannot be reviewed or altered by
any body other than the parliament itself.  As a result, the role of the French Constitutional Council is
restricted to reviewing laws that have been passed in both chambers but not yet promulgated.  After a
law becomes official, however, it can only be changed by parliamentary action.  See ANDREW KNAPP &
VINCENT WRIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE  61 (4th ed. 1989)
91. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Special Issue, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L.
ECON. &  ORG. 1 (1990) (developing the idea that these same conditions are also indications that states
are capable of independent political activity).
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zation” of politics tends to produce the politicization of courts.92  As a result, ju-
dicial decision-making tends to become politics carried on by other means.
How does this take place?  I argue that the institutions of a liberal legal cul-
ture facilitate the conversion of ideological positions into “internal” legal posi-
tions.  We can see this in the culture of legal training and in the core idea that
every interest is entitled to competent legal representation and articulation.
Well-trained lawyers are supposed to be able to state and articulate the most
far-fetched claims, and judges are supposed to be able to respond to and weigh
these arguments within the law.  It is not surprising therefore that, at least in the
United States, virtually every ideological or partisan position can be articulated
in law—usually in different ways—as more or less defensible legal positions.
Moreover, as de Tocqueville noted long ago, America’s political system is
particularly open to the formation and proliferation of associations and interest
groups.93  So, we have seen the emergence of a vast system of legal interest
groups whose aims are to develop respectable jurisprudential positions that cor-
respond to their particular partisan or ideological preferences, to recruit and
nurture articulate advocates for these views, and to place them in positions of
legal power.  On the “left,” we see such groups as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, National Organization for Women, Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, American Civil Liberties Union, and many
others. On the “right,” there are the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Federalist
Society, and many others. These organizations have been remarkably effective
at seeking their political interests within the legal terrain in which deliberation
and reasoning are the mode in which general rules are adopted and modified.
None of this would be so worrying if courts were simply expected to listen to
these arguments put by the lawyers in front of them.  There is much to be said
for the practice of public interest groups, whatever their goals, putting forward
amicus briefs stating the case for one decision or doctrinal amendment of an-
other.  Indeed, such a practice helps to articulate the general or societal inter-
ests that are considered in deciding cases. The problem is, however, that the
makeup of bench and legal officialdom in general is permeable to the influence
of the same interest groups.
So, in the United States, much of the “action” has to do with appointments.
Legislators, knowing that they cannot control judicial rule-making in a variety
of areas of public life, must try either to affect who sits on the bench or who
makes arguments for the government.  From John Adams’ midnight appoint-
ments to the federal judiciary, through various court-packing schemes, to the
removal of California judges over their death penalty votes, fights over who
shall be a judge or a prosecutor have been regular issues of American politics.
This is only to be expected.  Prosecutors at all levels are politically appointed—
typically by bare partisan majorities. Therefore, prosecutorial decisions, insofar
as they involve the exercise of judgment in a world of scarcity and uncertainty
92. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 1.
93. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3.
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probably ought to be held to a principle of democratic accountability.  But the
same arguments seem a bit less convincing when it comes to the makeup of the
judiciary itself.  Still, we have chosen to staff the bench with partisan political
appointees who require only a bare majority for their appointments.  Not sur-
prisingly, it is easy to characterize judges and courts in partisan terms within
such a system.
None of this is to say that the judges themselves are behaving like partisan
politicians: trading votes, brokering deals, or forming coalitions.  I have little
doubt that judges are deciding the cases before them in light of their own more
or less coherent jurisprudential ideas about what the law requires.  From the
perspective of the outside observer, however, their behavior is nonetheless pre-
dictable from a simple model of ideological voting.94  Since it is so predictable,
other political actors will tend to treat court decisions as political events and try
to shape and influence them for their own political reasons.
It is worth pointing out that the American form of politicized courts is un-
usual in the advanced democratic world.  This is so for many reasons.  Euro-
pean legal traditions are probably not as pluralistic—many of the continental
legal systems still see judicial decision-making as syllogistic—and there is
probably not the same proliferation of legal interest groups in many of those na-
tions.  Moreover, appointments to ordinary courts are almost always bureau-
cratic—one enters the judiciary as one would enter a civil service job.  And,
though appointments to the new constitutional courts are made by political
bodies, those appointments generally require super-majorities.  This require-
ment prevents the appointment of judges with immoderate ideological views.
Finally, courts in Europe are much less open to public scrutiny than are Ameri-
can courts.  The constitutional courts deliberate in secret, issue per curiam
opinions, and often do not permit the publication of dissents.  The result is that
interest groups are much less likely to be able to see how judges are ruling or
voting and subsequently criticize or praise them for their actions on the bench.
Thus, while I believe that European constitutional courts may be as political as
U.S. courts in the sense of engaging in lawmaking in ways not subject to legisla-
tive control, they are much less partisan, and their ideology tends to be centrist.
VII
CONCLUSION
When conditions are favorable for courts to exercise legislative powers, they
are free to do so across the board, whether or not the specific policy decisions
are best made in legal settings. There is a mismatch between the positive condi-
tions that permit judicialization and the normative justification of judge-made
94. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 65 (1993) (“[T]he attitudinal model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of
the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.  Simply put, Rehnquist
votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he
was extremely liberal.”).
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law.  This is politically dangerous in various ways.  It has the effect of politiciz-
ing courts—making judicial decisions appear to be politically motivated and
making appointments to the bench matters of partisan contention—of reducing
the legitimate abilities of the people or their representatives to legislate, and,
less often, of provoking crude and heavy-handed electoral responses.  There is a
need, therefore, for courts to take care when they relocate specific legislative
issues to legal settings, and taking such care requires the formulation of norma-
tive standards to guide the allocation of legislative authority.
What might such normative standards look like?  I suggest that different
kinds of legislation are appropriately made in different institutional settings.
Courts are well suited to make certain kinds of legislative rules—rules that need
to be developed in light of repeated experience in use, and that should answer
to concerns about equality, due process, and justice. This is not to say that the
legislature should not participate in making policy in these areas; I only argue
that courts have an important and continuing role in regulating legislative ac-
tivities in these areas.  Similar considerations should govern when administra-
tive agencies should legislate rules.  Rules that need, for whatever reason, to be
responsive to technical issues are often best formulated in settings where exper-
tise is available and professional norms can shape the policy discourse.
But the desirability of developing and enforcing norms for governing the lo-
cation of legislative authority is no assurance that such norms will develop or be
applied.  Specifically, it is doubtful that American judges protected by life ten-
ure and chosen in partisan political processes can be relied upon to exercise
precisely the kinds of nuanced restraint that would be called for. For that rea-
son, I think it is inevitable that, under certain circumstances, judges will exercise
legislative powers in areas where the legislature itself ought to do so.  Or, per-
haps worse, judges may resolve important disputes on an ad hoc basis and with-
out regard to any general principle that can be applied to decide similar cases.
Some scholars think that Bush v. Gore95 was such a case and that we should un-
derstand the attempt of some of the justices to assure the nation that they were
not developing a new branch of equal protection doctrine (establishing and ap-
pealing to a general principle) as the surest sign that such exercise was inappro-
priate.  Political reactions to such actions are inevitable and, whether they are
successful or not, they have the effect over time of making the court into an ex-
plicitly political institution.
In the introduction, I suggested that it may make sense for Americans to
consider some reforms that might alter the political dynamics of the Court.  The
reforms I suggested—requiring a supermajority in the Senate for appointments
and limiting justices to a single nonrenewable term—are already in place in
many European constitutional courts, and their empirical experience might be
informative.  A supermajority requirement for appointment would mean that
newly appointed judges would have to be acceptable across party and ideologi-
95. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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cal lines.  This would tend to discourage the appointment of ideologically ex-
treme judges and would probably tend to lead to a court filled with judicial
moderates.  Of course, judicial minds can and do change over time, and there
never can be an ironclad guarantee against judicial “drift.”  Still, fixing judicial
terms would tend to alleviate such problems.  Even if members did become ex-
treme in some dimensions, they could not serve on the Court for more than ten
or twelve years.
These two reforms, taken together, would likely lead to a different kind of
internal decision-making culture in the Court.  The members, being in broad
agreement, would tend to see real chances for coming to consensual agreements
on many cases.  The Court would probably begin developing practices aimed at
attaining broad agreement—even agreement based on widely shared princi-
ples—rather than settling for determining cases by the majoritarian rule of five.
Such a development would lead to an increased confidence in the Court both
among elected and appointed officials and among the public at large.  Support
for these conjectures can be obtained from the practices of other constitutional
courts.
In Germany, for example, justices on the Constitutional Court rarely issue
dissents but instead work largely by consensus in most cases.96  In addition, the
names of the justices are not familiar to the public.97  Since new justices tend to
be jurisprudential moderates by design, however, this phenomenon is not sur-
prising.  Consensus is, obviously, less difficult to achieve when most of the
members are in broad agreement.  Observation of the Italian and Spanish Con-
stitutional Courts point to the same conclusions.  Members and observers of
those courts emphasize that consensus is always aimed for and is frequently
achieved.98
Obviously, the European model has some limitations in a country as large
and diverse as the United States.  There is a chance that the Court would be re-
flective of the broad center of U.S. politics but that significant minorities would
not see their views reflected.  There is also a real concern that reforming the
Court will affect substantive outcomes.  It is not at all clear, however, that a
Court comprised of members who are broadly acceptable across the political
spectrum will be hostile to minorities.  In any case, the fact that terms would be
restricted would keep the court consistently open to new political forces.
A natural response to reform proposals—especially proposals that involve
amending the Constitution—to ignore them because they are infeasible.  With
respect to imposing term limits on appointments, this is a plausible response.
Such a reform would require mobilization of a very wide Article V coalition,
and we know from experience how difficult such coalitions are to form.  But a
supermajority requirement does not require constitutional change.  Such a re-
form can be implemented conventionally, as the British changed their constitu-
96. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 49.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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tion. If members of the Senate regarded a two-thirds majority as required for
appointment, they could simply (but not necessarily easily) refuse to approve
any nomination that failed to receive that level of support.  Alternatively, Sena-
tors could take advantage of procedural rights under Senate rules to block con-
sideration of members who lack filibuster-proof support.  Things would be a lit-
tle messy at first, of course, but such a stance could be defended on principled
grounds and might well be sufficient to implement the change.  Whether Sena-
tors would be capable of withstanding the partisan heat that would be put on
them is another matter.
